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COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF AFRICANA PHILOSOPHY
AND THE CONTINENTAL-ANALYTIC DIVIDE
TOMMY L. LOTT

ABSTRACT: Critical engagement involving philosophers trained in continental and
analytic traditions often takes its purpose to be a reconciliation of tensions arising from
differences in style, or method. Critical engagement in Africana philosophy, however, is
rarely focused on method, style, or orientation because philosophic research in this field,
regardless of orientation, has had to accommodate its empirical grounding in disciplines
outside of philosophy. I focus primarily on the comparative dimensions of three important
strands of this research: (1) a history of ideas, (2) a problem-orientation, and (3) a sub-area
specialization, to indicate why a need to reconcile tensions between continental and analytic
orientations has very little currency in Africana philosophy. Socio-economic problems faced
by African-descended people require multiple perspectives to accommodate the wide variety
of diasporic social contexts for a given proposal. I employ a selection of cases to illustrate
how Africana philosophy benefits from an interplay of many intersecting factors and that, as
an interdisciplinary area of research with a commitment to the incorporation of multiple
perspectives, it fosters cross-pollination and hybridization of continental and
analytic traditions.
Keywords: comparative philosophy, Africana, interdisciplinary

Long before Africana Philosophy gained official recognition by the American
Philosophical Association as an area of study within the discipline, Western
philosophy already had jelled into a rigid divide between continental and analytic
schools. (Quinton, 1995) The engagement of continental and analytic philosophers
interested in Africana thought suggests a model of how multifarious differences can
be negotiated to mutual benefit. Although the term ―comparative philosophy‖ often is
based on comparisons between Eastern and Western philosophy, it is also sometimes
meant to refer to comparisons between different orientations within these. (Mou,
2010) I consider several dimensions of such comparisons, with special emphasis on
the interplay between various modes of philosophical examination and empirical
inquiry.
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There are many well-established applied areas in philosophy, such as philosophy
of language, education, law, and science, in which philosophical thinking is brought
to bear on questions that arise within one of these disciplines. Some areas in
philosophy, such as epistemology and aesthetics, have generated theories that have
been applied in other applied areas such as philosophy of perception and philosophy
of art. I mention these applications of philosophy to other disciplines to point out that
the overlap of philosophical concerns with empirical-contingent matters suggests a
need to include the latter component (of many areas of philosophy) in the
conceptualization of the purpose of a comparison between different traditions. The
idea of critical engagement between continental and analytic traditions often takes, as
its purpose, a reconciliation of tensions arising from differences in style, or method.
In this regard it is important to consider the extent to which interdisciplinary
formations such as Marxist Studies, Cultural Studies, Ethnic Studies, Peasant Studies,
and Post-colonial Studies have provided a basis for the emergence of new areas in
philosophy, such as Africana and Native American philosophy. Given that the need to
reconcile tension between continental and analytic orientations has had very little
currency in these instances, the term ―critical engagement‖ is somewhat misleading.
Critical engagement in Africana philosophy is rarely focused on method, style, or
orientation because philosophic research in this field, regardless of orientation, has
had to accommodate its empirical grounding in disciplines outside of philosophy.
Rather than increasing tensions, this interdisciplinary feature has facilitated
coalescence and hybridization of the two schools.
This coalescence is especially noticeable in the attempt, by contemporary
philosophers, to articulate philosophical views found in traditional African cultures.
Despite strong parallels with Native American philosophy, the suggestion that a
philosophic discourse existed in ancient Africa has engendered an extensive debate
within African philosophy regarding the definition of philosophy. (Brandt, 1954;
Ladd, 1957; Appiah, 1992; Oruka, 1990; Hountondji, 1983) Differences in style, or
method, between continental and analytic philosophy, however, have not been an
issue in this debate. This is due mainly to the fact that the study of traditional African
philosophy has been pursued by Western-trained philosophers, representing both
orientations. (Wiredu, 1980; Hallen and Sodipo, 1986; Oruka, 1990)
The study of traditional African philosophy is one of several strands of Africana
philosophy engendered by interdisciplinary research that has played an important role
as a primary source for the study of Africana thought. I focus primarily on a history
of ideas, a problem-orientation, and a sub-area specialization as three important
strands. Many topics in Africana philosophy are related to socio-economic problems
faced by African-descended people throughout the diaspora, requiring multiple
perspectives to accommodate the wide variety of social contexts (that include Latin
America and Europe, along with Africa, the United States and the Caribbean) in
which a given proposal will have different renderings. I highlight the manner in
which Africana philosophy has benefited from the interplay of many intersecting
factors. In particular, I indicate how, due to its inherently interdisciplinary nature,
Africana philosophy is also inherently pluralistic, and that, as an area within the
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discipline, it came into being as a joint product of cross-pollination of continental and
analytic traditions.
The topics I discuss below represent my focus on the three strands I have
identified above. They are drawn from African, Afro-Caribbean, and African
American philosophy to represent specialists from different sub-areas and to include
continental and analytic traditions. In various ways, the selected topics illustrate how
insights advanced by continental and analytic philosophers alike have jointly
enhanced our understanding of central questions in the field. They also illustrate how
the interdisciplinary nature of Africana thought provides a source for philosophical
ideas. Whether they are dealing with questions pertaining to language and meaning,
ontology and epistemology, or to social and political values, philosophers
representing both orientations have been concerned with the formulation of problems,
the clarification of key concepts, the generation of pertinent issues, and the
assessment of arguments for, or against, various proposals. In the cases I consider,
this rather pragmatic concern with practical matters, and the high value placed on the
generation of ideas, issues, or insights, that shed light on the question at hand,
overrides concerns regarding orientation, method, or style. Discussions of differences
in style, method, or orientation have not gained priority over discussions of ideas that
advance thinking about a given problem. At this stage of its emergence, ideas and
method have pride of place in Africana philosophic research.
I first consider a selection of topics that have been addressed across differences in
socio-historical contexts, sub-area specialization, and philosophical orientations to
indicate how various subjects have been enhanced by multiple perspectives reflecting
these differences. I next consider the role of continental and analytic philosophers in
the development of a canon in the field, to show how the development of Africana
philosophy has been a joint undertaking. Finally, I turn to consider a turn-of-thecentury, African American philosopher, Alain Locke, to draw attention to the two
versions of his dissertation as a methodological paradigm of how to navigate the
continental-analytic divide by mastering both styles. The comparative aspects I
discuss involve many areas where Africana philosophy overlaps and intersects with
other disciplines, as well as with various areas in mainstream and non-Western
philosophy. With an eye to these intersections, I indicate the extent to which, in the
case of Africana philosophy, critical engagement is multi-faceted.
1. CROSS-CURRENTS WITHIN AFRICANAN PHILOSOPHY
Cultural differences associated with geographic location have fostered a discourse in
Africana philosophy representing multiple perspectives that aim to shed light on
problems shared throughout the African diaspora. As a common source for a history
of ideas, continental and analytic philosophers alike have devoted careful scrutiny to
views published by ex-slaves, by black abolitionists and emigrationists, by PanAfricanists, and by philosophers concerned with the impact of modernization on
traditional aesthetics and cultural values.
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Slave narratives were written by Africans, such as Olaudah Equiano, AfroCaribbeans, such as Mary Prince, and African Americans, such as Frederick
Douglass. (Equiano, 1789; Prince, 1831; Douglass, 1848) In each case basic
questions regarding human freedom, rights and dignity are raised, yet the predicament
of slaves in each sociohistorical context is quite different. These basic questions are
taken to be universal and to transcend the different contexts within the diaspora. For
this reason, the discussion of slave narratives, and other writings by ex-slaves, in
Africana philosophy has included specialists in all three sub-areas representing
continental and analytic traditions.
A topic’s status as universal is sometimes ambiguous, as when a proposal that has
been advanced to deal with a particular problem in a specific context seems to be at
odds with what is proposed in a different social context. For example, in his wellknown 1897 address to the Negro Academy on the conservation of races W.E.B. Du
Bois introduced the Hegelian notion of double consciousness to argue that African
Americans have a duty to retain their cultural identity. (Du Bois, 1897) His view of
development and social progress is thoroughly imbued with, and deeply influenced
by, a wide reading in continental philosophy. In particular, he displays his
background in American pragmatism and German philosophy when he deconstructs
the biological notion of race and proposes a reconstruction along the lines of culture.
In his recent book, Tradition and Modernity (1997), Kwame Gyekye argues, in
analytic fashion, that individuals in African societies have a duty to transcend their
specific cultural identities in support of a national culture. When taken together, the
positions advocated by Du Bois and Gyekye seem to entail mutually exclusive
imperatives that are context-specific. Indeed, there seems to be a tension between Du
Bois’s view that, in the American context of white domination, there is an imperative
for African Americans to retain their distinctive Africana culture and Gyekye’s view
that, in the African context, there is an imperative for members of different ethnic
groups to adopt a national culture. The former promotes black pride to counter the
negative effects of America’s legal segregation, whereas the latter promotes national
unity by permiting individuals in African societies to adopt a national identity that
transcends having specific ethnic identities. A two-phase account is needed to resolve
the seeming inconsistency between these two views of cultural pluralism and social
progress. Du Bois and Geyekye are not in disagreement given that, for both, only
with the elimination of racial, or ethnic, domination can the option to transcend one’s
specific ethnic identity be exercised. From the standpoint of the continental-analytic
divide this seems to be a case in which the viewpoint of an African American
specialist, trained in continental philosophy, is contrary to the viewpoint of an African
specialist with an analytic orientation. Notice that each viewpoint is important to
consider and that, by contextualizing the problem, both proposals advance our
understanding of the issues.
Some apparent differences in doctrine that, perhaps, have been influenced by
diaspora location and sociohistorical context, cannot be so easily resolved. These
differences are reflected in some of the nineteenth-century debates regarding
emigrationism. Although the idea that ex-slaves would have to leave America to gain
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social equality was advocated by African Americans, such as Mary Ann Shadd-Carey
and Martin Delany, their views were remarkably different from views held by AfroCaribbean thinkers such as Edwin Blyden and Marcus Garvey. (Delany, 1849; ShaddCarey, 1852; Garvey, 1923) These African American thinkers were less enamored
with returning to Africa, often proposing Canada, Mexico and Haiti as possible sites,
whereas the Afro-Caribbean thinkers I cite insisted upon a return to Africa as a
necessary condition for emigration. Ideological differences of this sort, however, may
not be influenced so much by diaspora-location as they are a reflection of the
ambivalence prevalent throughout the diaspora towards Africa as a homeland for
descendants.
For many reasons, the much-contested African-centered nationalism in Africana
thought displays the influence of sociohistorical context. Toward the end of the
nineteenth century, at the height of colonialism in Africa, some version of panAfricanism was widely supported by a vast majority of black intellectuals throughout
the diaspora. Despite the popularity of Marcus Garvey in the 1920s, in post-colonial
Africa, with the exception of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, it was never widely
embraced by African heads of state. Representing a line of thought that is specific to
the African American context, Tommie Shelby has proposed to replace the notion of
an African-centered cultural nationalism with a notion of black solidarity that he
maintains is more pragmatic for African Americans. (Shelby, 2005) His revised
notion is suited to focus strictly on ending antiblack racism in America without a
commitment to maintaining Africana cultures. Although disagreement among
philosophers on issues pertaining to nationalism and culture is, undoubtedly,
influenced by many factors, sociohistorical context is often a determinant. While a
proponent’s philosophic orientation is relevant to understanding her method of
arriving at a certain position, as well as her grounds for maintaining it, cross-currents
involving these orientations have combined with other factors to generate new lines
of thought that yield new insights, and new debates.
2. SHAPING THE CANON: CROSS-POLLINATING
CONTINENTAL AND ANALYTIC TRADITIONSS
Some of the cross-currents that give rise to multiple perspectives on topics shared
throughout the diaspora also have contributed to the establishment of a canon that
includes classic texts commonly referenced by philosophers interested in a thinker’s
ideas, or in a particular subject. The examples I cite below involve the treatment of a
subject from multiple perspectives by sub-area specialists and the interpretation of a
thinker’s ideas by philosophers representing both traditions.
Questions regarding the moral and political grounds of slavery and colonialism
have been a source of philosophical reflection in Western philosophy since the time
of the Greeks. (Williams, 1993) In Africana philosophy, a critical examination of
these subjects has been undertaken by continental and analytic philosophers
throughout the diaspora. Almost everyone versed in Africana thought is familiar with
C.L.R. James’s classic social and political account of the Haitian revolution in The
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Black Jacobins (1938). Hardly anyone knows, however, that it was presaged by Anna
Julia Cooper’s lesser known French-language doctoral dissertation in 1925. Cooper
was an ex-slave who earned her undergraduate degree at Oberlin in 1887 and her
doctorate at the Sorbonne in 1925. She is better-known for her classic feminist text, A
Voice From the South (1892). James was a Marxist historian, well-known for his
theoretical writings in political theory, especially his unpublished Notes on Dialectics
(1948) and his masterpiece in social history, Beyond A Boundary (1963). Cooper’s
analysis of the Haitian revolution relies on French Enlightenment philosophy to
account for the ideological grounding of slave resistance, whereas James’s Marxist
analysis casts a skeptical glance at that tradition. Along with a comparison of an
African-American female ex-slave viewpoint with an Afro-Caribbean Marxist male
viewpoint as a complex set of factors influencing the respective accounts, in this case,
multiple perspectives also include - as a factor equally influencing their views - the
Anglophone context for James’s book and the Francophone context for Cooper’s
dissertation. Whichever factors we choose to account for differences in their
respective analyses notwithstanding, these two philosophers represent
interdisciplinary thinkers, each with a strong background in continental philosophy,
who have advanced our thinking about a central topic in Africana philosophy.
Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth is another classic text in Africana
philosophy. In Fanon and the Crisis of European Man (1995), Lewis Gordon, an
Afro-Caribbean specialist, employs his training in continental philosophy, specifically
Husserl’s phenomenology, to interpret Fanon’s thought. Analytic philosophers, such
as Bernard Boxill, have also presented interpretations of Fanon’s text. Boxill, a
specialist in African American philosophy, extracts a line of reasoning from Wretched
of the Earth to spell out a moral argument regarding protest and self-respect. (Boxill,
1976) A quite different reading is presented by Nigerian philosopher, Oladipo
Fashina. He presents a logically rigorous version of an argument in Fanon’s text that
represents a non-humanistic line of thought. (Fashina, 1989) In this case,
philosophers representing multiple perspectives, and trained in both traditions, have
reflected upon a classic work in continental philosophy by a Francophone AfroCaribbean philosopher, and have arrived at quite different interpretations.
3. ALAIN LOCKE’S DISSERTATION ON VALUES:
MERGING CONTINENTAL AND ANALYTIC TRADITIONS
Around the turn of the century, before the rise of logical positivism and the influence
of the Vienna Circle on Anglo-American philosophers, W.E.B. Du Bois and Alain
Locke were studying at European universities. (Quinton, 1995) While at Harvard both
were students of the well-known American pragmatist, William James. Pragmatism,
as a school of thought associated with American philosophers influenced by Charles
Peirce, John Dewey, as well as James, has broadly appealed to continental and
analytic philosophers alike. James stands out, with his experimental research in
psychology, as an interdisciplinary thinker. In turn, James, an empirical scientist, was
influenced by French philosopher, Henri Bergson. The reason for James’s high
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regard in both traditions, however, was not his scientific, or continental, leanings.
Rather, his broad appeal is due more to his influence on two of the twentiethcentury’s greatest philosophers – Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Research in Africana philosophy on two of James’s students, Du Bois and Locke,
reflects these historical traces of American Pragmatism on continental and analytic
traditions.
As a Rhodes scholar at Oxford Locke wrote a dissertation on value theory that
displayed the influence of James’ teachings regarding the centrality of experience.
Other than James, almost all of his sources were early twentieth-century continental
philosophers, including Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong. He mailed his
dissertation to Oxford from Berlin, where he actually had written it during the spring
and summer of 1910. Having begun coursework toward earning a doctorate at the
University of Berlin, he attended the lectures of many distinguished German
philosophers, including Georg Simmel, and Ernst Cassirer. (Harris and Molesworth,
2008) Locke’s thesis was not accepted for several reasons. Most notable was his
misfortune of having the logician, J. Cook Wilson, assigned to read it. When financial
concerns became paramount, and Locke was unable to complete his doctorate at the
University of Berlin, he accepted a teaching position at Howard University in
Washington, D.C.
Several years later, in 1917, he wrote another version of his Oxford thesis to
satisfy requirements for a doctorate at Harvard. As an undergraduate at Harvard (and
later at the University of Berlin) he had studied with Hugo Meunsterber. Another of
his undergraduate teachers, Ralph Barton Perry, a specialist working in value theory,
was his thesis advisor. Needless to say, Perry was much more suitable to read Locke’s
dissertation – especially so, given Locke’s psychological focus on valuation. In the
Harvard dissertation, Locke transformed his original tome, ―A Genetic Theory of
Value‖, which was lucidly written in a continental style, into a somewhat less
ambitious analytic project, ―A Classification of Values.‖ What is important to note
here is that, he learned from his experience with Cook at Oxford how better to
negotiate his decidedly continental orientation with Perry’s analytic leanings. The
second version of his dissertation was a hybrid of continental and analytic
philosophy.
Given the hegemony of analytic philosophers in many departments, as well as
throughout the professional organizations, the practice of recasting insights derived
from continental philosophy into an analytic mode of discourse is a familiar means of
negotiating the continental-analytic divide. While most philosophers interested in
Africana thought are trained specifically in one of the two traditions, the audience for
their work represents both orientations. The fact that many of the major Africana
philosophers, such as Cooper, Du Bois, Locke, James, and Fanon, represent the
continental tradition is an advantage for continental philosophers and indirectly
fosters pluralism in the study of Africana philosophy. The merit of this inherent
tendency toward pluralism cannot be overstated. For, an important lesson to be
garnered from the two versions of Locke’s dissertation on values is that, on this
particular subject, a wholly analytic, or continental, treatment is inadequate.
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Locke’s project on values was directly related to his later writings on aesthetics,
art and music, for which he is much better known. In his self-proclaimed role as
―mid-wife‖ to the Harlem Renaissance writers and artists he is acknowledged by
Amie Cesaire and Leopold Senghor to have inspired the Negritude movement.
(Kennedy, 1972; Senghor, 1977) Although this movement originated in the American
context, it gained momentum mostly in Francophone regions of the Caribbean and
Africa. Many questions regarding aesthetics are culturally specific. However, in the
case of Negritude, differences in cultural values, influenced by socio-historical
context, did not hinder proponents from claiming a cross-cultural application of their
ideas throughout the diaspora. It is noteworthy that, although topics related to
Negritude also raise important issues of great interest to analytic philosophers, even
in its earliest American stage during the Harlem Renaissance, the movement was an
interdisciplinary project involving philosophers who were grounded mainly in
continental philosophy. (Sartre, 1948; Senghor, 1977; Bernasconi, 2001)
4. CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCERNS
The need for critical engagement to bridge the continental-analytic divide is fairly
non-existent in the case of Africana philosophy because often the two styles are
immersed in cross-dialogue with a focus on the question at hand - rendering concerns
about orientation, or style, less important. In addition to this pragmatic factor, I want
to suggest a more fundamental reason having to do with the interdisciplinary nature
of Africana philosophy. With a focus on some of the major strands of Africana
philosophy, I have already cited above examples of critical engagement involving
exchanges between philosophers representing both orientations and specialization in
the sub-areas. I have also cited examples of critical engagement involving exchanges
between philosophers within each of the two schools regarding the interpretation of a
classic text. I will conclude with a consideration of intersections with various
disciplines to acknowledge comparative aspects of Africana philosophy that involve
overlap with interdisciplinary studies, e.g., Ethnic, Post-colonial, or Women’s
Studies; with other areas of Western philosophy, e.g., Marxism, Latin American, or
feminism; or with Non-Western philosophy, e.g., Asian, or Native American.
The relation of Africana philosophy to other disciplines indicates a structural
basis for the cross-dialogue between continental and analytic philosophers. The
empirical circumstances of African people throughout the diaspora accounts for the
social and political focus—specifically on socioeconomic problems—in Africana
philosophy. Various disciplines in the social sciences, along with history, literature,
art, and music are best suited to study and establish a body of empirical knowledge
regarding these contingent matters. Africana philosophy draws upon all of these
disciplines, but so do other categories of interdisciplinary studies, such as Women’s,
Ethnic, Cultural, and Post-colonial Studies. Indeed, many subjects in Africana
philosophy often have been topics of prior debates in Africana thought generally, or
subjects previously discussed in related disciplines. In this important respect Africana
philosophy overlaps other disciplines and is inherently interdisciplinary.
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There is a great deal of research, pursued in other disciplines, that involves a
critical examination of issues pertaining to racism, slavery, and colonial oppression.
Just as scholars in those disciplines have not established an exclusive claim on these
subjects, neither have philosophers who address issues of specific concern to
philosophers, for empirical findings that have a bearing on their philosophic concerns
cannot be ignored. For this reason, debates and exchanges within Africana philosophy
are not limited to the multiple perspectives influenced by, and reflecting, sociohistorical context, area of specialization and continental-analytic orientation. On
many topics such as race, affirmative action, criminal justice, punishment, health
care, welfare rights and reparations, Africana philosophy also critically engages many
mainstream philosophic concerns related to policy.
This engagement can, in some cases, be a direct challenge to a view that is wellregarded in mainstream philosophy. An example of this would be Kawasi Wiredu’s
appeal to the conceptualization of truth in his native Akan language to question
whether Alfred Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is universal. (Wiredu, 1980) Unlike
this philosophy of language case, involving a well-known philosopher’s theory of
truth, more often this engagement is in the manner of applied philosophy. In these
latter cases some subject outside of philosophy is critically examined by philosophers.
For example, social scientists, such as Orlando Patterson and historians such as
Eugene Genovese have been challenged by philosophers on their views of the
injustice of slavery. (Lott, 1998; Mc Gary, 1992) Relying on liberal democratic
notions of paternalism and social justice, philosophers have raised questions
regarding the social and political implications of empirical accounts by social
scientists and historians.
In certain instances of mainstream-Africana engagement, philosophers employ the
views of historical European philosophers to interpret an Africana thinker, or text.
Sometimes the aim is to establish a direct parallel. This strategy is employed by Jill
Gordon in her comparative analysis of Malcom X’s ―Ballot or the Bullet‖ speech and
John Locke’s teachings on resistance in the Second Treatise. (Gordon, 1995) It is also
employed by Julie Ward in her comparative analysis of arguments against slavery by
Olaudah Equiano and Ottobah Cugoano in which she traces many of their ideas to
views expressed in the writings of specific European Enlightenment thinkers such as
Granville Sharp, Thomas Clarkson, and James Ramsay. (Ward, 1998)
Sometimes the aim of Africana-mainstream critical engagement is to appropriate
and employ an argument, or line of reasoning, that can be found in a European
philosopher’s text. In her lecture on Douglass’s slave narrative, Angela Davis
employs Hegel’s master-slave parable to interpret the shift in Douglass’
consciousness that motivated his quest for freedom. (Harris, 1983) In a similar
fashion, Bernard Boxill develops an argument for reparations based on John Locke’s
view in the Second Treatise. (Boxill, 2003) What should be noted here is that Davis’s
continental orientation and Boxill’s analytic style are equally important modes of
arriving at insights that shed light, respectively, on Douglass’s text and the subject of
reparations.
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The comparative aspects of Africana philosophy I have cited indicate the extent to
which continental and analytic traditions have been equally important to the growth
and development of this emerging field. No special claim is being made for Africana
philosophy in this regard, for other areas within the discipline may also represent
similar contributions by representatives of both traditions. The domination of analytic
philosophy by logical positivism and linguistics and continental philosophy by
phenomenology and hermeneutics is reminiscent of tensions between rationalists and
empiricists in modern philosophy resulting from their different views of the role of
reason and sense perception in epistemology. What has gone unremarked in both
cases is the extent to which the respective views bleed into each other, resulting in
hybridization on both sides. Whether this bleeding process entitles us to speak of a
―merging‖ of the two traditions is an empirical question to be decided by future
developments within the field.
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